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THE SADDAM TRIAL: CHALLENGES TO MEETING INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS WITH REGARD TO THE DEFENSE

Mark S. Ellis*
I. INTRODUCTION

It is an unfortunate fact that the Saddam trial will likely be remembered more for its chaotic nature and inefficiencies than for its contribution
to establishing accountability for international crimes. Yet, the Supreme
Iraqi Criminal Tribunal ("Iraqi Tribunal") addressed a number of important
legal issues during the Dujail trial.
The Iraqi Tribunal dealt with many issues touching on the relationship between the Iraqi Tribunal and the defense. For instance, the Iraqi Tribunal regularly removed defendants from the trial proceedings because of
disruptive behavior. Defense counsel, too, were dismissed from the trial
proceedings. The Iraqi Tribunal also took the unique step of imposing counsel on defendants against their wishes.
Were these steps consistent with Iraqi and international law? From
the perspective of the defense these Iraqi Tribunal actions were improper
and made the subsequent proceedings illegal. The counter view is that the
tribunal had the legal authority to take these actions in the interest of justice.
This article will review key Iraqi Tribunal decisions relating to the defense,
and determine whether the defendants' rights were violated. Because the
Iraqi Tribunal relies on international law,' this assessment will include a
review of international treaty law, decisions from existing international war
crimes courts, and Iraqi law.
II. WAS THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL CORRECT IN REFUSING DEFENDANTS THE
RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION?

The Statute for the Iraqi High Tribunal establishes a series of rights
afforded to defendants to ensure that they receive a "just [and] fair trial." 2 A

.
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1 Qanoon AI-Mahkamat A1-Jeena'eyyat AI-Eraqiyyat AI-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi
High Tribunal] art. 13, Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/docume
nts/ISTstatuteofficialenglish.pdf (Iraq).
2 Id.art. 19(4).
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defendant in the Iraqi Tribunal receives extensive procedural and substantive protections, including the following minimum guarantees:
A. To be informed promptly and in detail of the content nature and cause
and of the charge against him;
B. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense
and to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing and to meet
with him privately. The accused is entitled to have non-Iraqi legal representation, so long as the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi;
C. To be tried without undue delay;
D. To be tried in his presence, and to use a lawyer of his own choosing,
and to be informed of his right [to] assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance and to have the right to request such aid to appoint a lawyer
without paying the fees, case if he does not have sufficient means to pay
for it; if he does not have the financial ability to do so.
E. The accused shall have the right to request the defense witnesses, the
witnesses for the prosecution, and to discuss with them any evidence that
support his defense in accordance with the law.
F. The defendant shall not be forced to confess and shall have the right to
remain silent and not provide any testimony and that
silen[ce] shall not be
3
interpreted as evidence of convection or innocence.
Noticeably absent from the Statute is any provision for the right to
self-representation, 4 making the Iraqi Tribunal the only "international or
internationalised" tribunal that does not ensure such a right.5 The right to
self-representation is guaranteed by a number of international and regional
conventions 6 and is seen as a fundamental right. 7 However, a defendant's
3 Id.
4 An

earlier draft of the Statute did, in fact, include such a right. Article 20 of the earlier
draft Statute stated that a defendant had the right "to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing." Qanoon AI-Mahkamat Al-Jeena'eyyat A1-Eraqiyyat
AI-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal] art. 20(d)(4), Dec. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human-rights/Statute.htm.
5 Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation at International Criminal
Tribunals: Striking a Balance between FairnessandEffectiveness, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 64,
76-77 (2006).
6

See e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(2)(d), Nov. 2, 1969, 1144

U.N.T.S. 143; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 19,

1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(3)(c), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. It should be

noted, however, that many civil law countries do not guarantee a defendant's right to selfrepresentation. E.g. Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation Versus Assignment of Defense
Counsel Before International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 31, 35 (2006).
7 See Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on
Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel,
18-19
(Appeals Chamber, Nov. 1, 2004).
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right to self-representation is not absolute; it is a qualified right that can be
restricted or even denied in certain circumstances.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has wrestled with the issue of such representation during most of its
life cycle. Although the ICTY's Statute guarantees the right of the accused
to conduct his or her own defense, this has been restricted by the tribunal's
own decisions.
In the case of Prosecutorv. Slobodan Milosevic,9 the prosecutor requested that counsel be assigned against the wishes of Mr. Milosevic. Although the tribunal denied the prosecutor's request, it nonetheless emphasised that international and regional treaties "plainly articulate a right to
defend oneself in person." 10 However, the tribunal declared that "the right to
defend oneself in person is not absolute ... there may be circumstances...
where it is in the interests of justice to appoint counsel."' 1 In short, the accused "under customary international law ... has a right not to have counsel.' 2
The ICTY later confirmed its position that the right to selfrepresentation could be limited or denied under appropriate circumstances.
Once again, the issue was whether the tribunal could order the appointment
of defense counsel to assist Mr. Milosevic, even though he did not want the
assistance. The tribunal structured its decision on the position that appointed
legal representation was imperative for a fair trial.13 The tribunal ruled that
it was "plain from the medical reports" that the accused was not fit to de-

8 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 21(d), May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/
legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf; see also Directive on the Assignment of Defence
Counsel, Doc. IT/73/Rev. 11, art. 5 (July 29, 2006), http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/indext.htm.
9 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution
Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Trial Chamber, Apr. 4, 2003).
'o Id.136.
Id. 140.
12 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Status Conference, Transcript, 18
"

(Aug. 30, 2001).
13 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of
32-33 (Trial Chamber, Sept. 22, 2004). Nina H.B. Jorgensen elaboDefence Counsel,
rates: "the key point is perhaps that the right to a fair trial obligates the Court to be protective
of the legitimacy of its own processes and to consider fairness globally." Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation at International Criminal Tribunals: Striking a

Balance between FairnessandEffectiveness, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 64, 69 (2006).
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fend 14himself and that allowing him to defend himself was delaying the

trial.

In its decision, the ICTY judges looked to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence to clarify when the right of selfrepresentation can be limited.' 5 The tribunal concluded that the fact that the
law of some States precludes a defendant in a criminal case from representing himself, requiring that a lawyer assist him with his defense, is not incompatible with the ECHR. 16 Thus, in the case of Croissant v. Germany,17
the European Court of Human Rights held that where the accused had appointed two counsel of his own choosing, the Regional Court's insistence
upon the appointment of a third in spite of the accused's strong objection to
that appointment did not violate Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Specifically, this
appointment did not violate the minimum right of an accused "to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing." The
court stated that
it is for the courts to decide whether the interests of justice require that the
accused be defended by counsel appointed by them. When appointing defence counsel the national courts must certainly have regard to the defendant's wishes .... However, they can override those wishes when there are

relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.18

The court specifically noted that "avoiding interruptions or adjournments
corresponds to an interest ofjustice which is relevant in the present case and
may well justify an appointment against the accused's wishes."' 9
The tribunal concluded that Articles 20 and 21(4)(d) of the the
ICTY Statute allowed for the assignment of counsel. 20 The tribunal ruled
14

sel,

Milosevic, Case no. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Coun1 (Sept. 22, 2004).

15 Id. 43.
16

Id.

17

Croissant v. Germany, 237 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (1992).

18

Id. 29 (emphasis added).

'9 Id. 28.

Article 20(1) reads: "The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious
and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence,
with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses." ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 20(1). Article 21(4)(d) secures the right of the
accused "to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right;
and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so
20

require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to
pay for it." Id.art. 21 (4)(d).
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that the overarching right to a fair trial including the right to a defense, may
lead to the assignment of counsel to conduct the defense for the accused.2 ,
Furthermore, the need for the trial to continue overrode
22 the importance of
respecting the right of the accused to represent himself.
The assigned counsel for Milosevic appealed the decision of the
Trial Chamber and argued that the right to self-representation constituted "a
fundamental principle" protected by both European and international law
and that the trial chamber erred in its interpretation of the ICTY Statute. 3
Defense also argued that the trial chamber did not correctly adhere to past
decisions by the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR). Defense argued that
[t]he circumstances in which counsel have been assigned to an unwilling
defendant at the ICTY and ICTR have been limited to circumscribed situations, largely concerning obstructionist behaviour by defendants. This is
not the case in the present situation, where the sole possible justification
for considering the imposition of counsel relates to the health of the achimself from the
cused, who has consistently asserted his right to represent
24
time he was transferred into the custody of the 1CTY.
On appeal, the tribunal affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial
chamber's decision to impose defense counsel. 25 Although the appeals
chamber found that the trial chamber's restriction to self-representation
failed a proportionality test, it stated that the right to a fair trial may, where
appropriate, lead to the assignment of counsel for the accused. The right to
self-representation "may be curtailed on the grounds that a defendant's
self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper
and expeditious conduct of his trial."26

21 Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence
Counsel, 51.
22 Id. 33.
23 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Appeal Against the Trial Cham-

ber's Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, 9 44-45 (Appeals Chamber, Sept. 29,
2004).
24 Id. 57.
25 Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
12-14 (Appeals
of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel,
Chamber, Nov. 1,2004). The appeals chamber concluded that the trial chamber had not
abused its discretion in restricting Milosevic's right to self-representation. However, they
stated that the trial chamber should have applied the "proportionality principle" and imposed
a more "carefully calibrated set of restrictions" on Milosevic's trial participation. Id. 1518.
26

Id.

13.
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III. WAS THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL CORRECT IN IMPOSING STANDBY COUNSEL
ON THE DEFENDANTS?

Addressing previous discussions as to whether counsel can be assigned to obstructionist defendants, the ICTY trial chamber in Prosecutorv.
Segelj answered in the affirmative.2 7 The tribunal ruled that standby counsel
could be assigned to a defendant despite his objection.28 Finding that the
defendant's attitude and actions were obstructionist, the tribunal determined
that the appointment of standby counsel was in the interest of justice and the
best way to maintain the integrity of the proceedings. 29 The tribunal ruled
that
[t]he phrase "in the interests of justice" potentially has a broad scope. It
includes the right to a fair trial, which is not only a fundamental right of
the Accused, but also a fundamental interest of the Tribunal related to its
own legitimacy. In the context of the right to a fair trial, the length of the
case, its size and complexity need to be taken into account. The complex
legal, evidential and procedural issues that arise in a case of this magnitude
may fall outside the competence even of a legally qualified accused, especially where that accused is in detention without access to all the facilities
he may need. Moreover, the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that the trial proceeds30 in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or disruptions.
The Se.elj tribunal tempered the effect of standby counsel on the
fundamental right of self-representation by having standby counsel serve
simply as a "legal assistant" to the defendant. The tribunal suggested that
standby counsel should help the accused prepare his case in both the pretrial and trial phases. This would include, among other things, (1) reviewing
copies of all documents relating to the case, (2) being present in the courtroom during the trial proceedings, and (3) questioning witnesses, if required. However, the tribunal was clear in stating that the defendant should
maintain control over the content of the questioning. 31
In an August 2006 decision, the Segelj trial chamber referred to decisions of the ECHR in ruling that counsel should be assigned to Segelj,
thereby terminating his self-representation. 32 In the case of Saday v. Tur27 See Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with his Defense (Trial Chamber II, May
9, 2003).
21 Id.
2, 29.
29 See id. 26-27.

30

Id. 21.

"' Id. 30.
32 Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel % 16,
24 (Trial Chamber I, Aug. 21, 2006).
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key,33 the ECHR stated that personal verbal attacks against a judge may
warrant sanctions if they create an atmosphere detrimental to the orderly
functioning ofjustice.3 4 The court noted:
that as the function of tribunals is to grant justice, and their role is fundamental in states where rule of law is guaranteed, they have an interest in
winning respect from the public and that magistrates must, in order to
carry out their functions, enjoy such credibility without obstacle. It is
therefore necessary while
they are in the service to protect them from of35
fensive verbal attacks.
In its decision, the Sge"el tribunal also took careful notice of a number of states that allow for the mandatory assignment of defense counsel.
The French Code of Criminal Procedure allows substantial participation in
case strategy by defendants on whom counsel has been imposed, provided
the proceedings are not disrupted by unseemly conduct.36 In Italy, a person
subjected to mandatory appointment of counsel retains the right to participate in the trial and is still allowed to speak and question witnesses. 37 The
German Code of Criminal Procedure provides for mandatory appointment
of counsel for serious crimes and discretionary appointment in minor cases
with difficult factual or legal problems.3 8 With the judge's permission, the
defendant may question witnesses and experts.3 9 Criminal procedure codes
in countries of the former Yugoslavia have provisions substantially similar
to the aforementioned ones, allowing the defendant a measure of involvement in and control of the case even after mandatory imposition of counsel.40
In an appeal of the August 2006 Segelj trial chamber decision, the
appeals chamber confirmed the lower court's finding that the accused's
conduct-which included abusive language, intimidation of the witnesses,
and general obstructionist behavior-was a "substantial and persistent obstruction to the proper and expeditious conduct of the trial" warranting the
suspension of Seselj's right to represent himself.4 1 However, the appeals
Saday c. Turquie [Saday v. Turk.], http://www.echr.coe.int (search under Case Law for
Application No. 32458/96) (2006).
14 See id. 34.
35 Id. 33 (author's translation).
36
Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 21
(Trial Chamber I, Aug. 21, 2006).
37 Id.
33

38

id.

39 Id.

40

Id. at 8, n.50

41 Prosecutor v.

egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber's Decision on Assignment of Counsel (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 20, 2006).
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court ultimately reversed the trial chamber's decision to impose counsel on
Seselj because the trial chamber failed to give Seselj the requisite formal
warning that if he continued in his obstructionist conduct, counsel could be
imposed on him. "[A] warning with regard to possible assignment of counsel needs to be explicit," the court stated, "in the form of an oral or written
statement to an accused explaining the disruptive behaviour and that, if it
persists, the consequence
will be restriction on the accused's right to self' 2
representation.
On November 27, 2006, the trial chamber concluded that the accused's self-representation during the previous month had "substantially
obstructed the proper and expeditious conduct of the proceedings" and ruled
that "permanent assignment of counsel to represent the accused [was] at this
point justified.A 3 The tribunal further ordered that Segelj's participation in
the trial proceedings must be through assigned counsel, thus reinforcing the
right of the tribunal to impose counsel. 44
In yet another qualification on the right to self-representation, the
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Jankovi6 ruled that the right to self-representation
can be exercised only by a defendant who truly understands the choice he is
making.4 5 The tribunal ruled that "the election of such a right must be made
by an accused who is literate and competent."A476 This right must be exercised
"voluntarily, unequivocally and intelligently."
Similar to the Saddam case, the ICTY in Jankovii found that the defendant obstructed the trial's proceedings with abusive and disruptive conduct. For this reason, the tribunal held that it was not in the interest of justice to permit the accused to represent himself; thus, assistance of counsel
should be imposed on the defendant.48
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has also
ruled on the issue of self-representation in several cases relevant to the Iraqi
Tribunal. As with the ICTY, the ICTR's Statute guarantees the right to selfrepresentation. 49 Article 20(4)(d) entitles the accused

42

Id. 26.

Press Release, Vojislav eelj Assigned Counsel by Trial Chamber, (Nov. 27, 2006),
availableat ahttp://www.un.org/icty/lasert-e/index.htm.
43

44

Id.

See Prosecutor v. Jankovid & Stankovid, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision Following
Registrar's Notification of Radovan Stankovi6's Request for Self-Representation, 9 (Trial
Chamber I, Aug. 19, 2005).
46 Id.
45

47 Id.
48 Id.

22-25.
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art 21(4)(d), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1598. available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2004.pdf.
49
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[t]o be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed,
if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interest of justice
so require [sic], and without payment by him or her
in any such case if he
50
or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
Similar to the ICTY, the ICTR has also restricted this right. In the
case of Prosecutorv. Barayagwiza,51 the ICTR was the first international
war crimes tribunal to squarely confront a defendant's right to selfrepresentation.5 2 The defendant in the case filed a request for his counsel to
be withdrawn:
If this Chamber rules that my counsels are required to continue to be present at trial contrary to my instructions, I no longer wish to be represented
by them. I would regret it if I am forced to make this decision because my
counsel have properly represented me from the beginning. However, under
no circumstances are they authorizedto represent me in any respect whatsoever in this trial. It is for this reason that I am forced to put an end to the
mandate I entrusted given them....
My Counsels are instructed not to represent me in that trial. Thus, their
forced presence in the trial is the continuation of violation of my rights by
a Tribunal incapable
of respecting fundamental human rights, contrary to
53
the UN Charter.
The ICTR, however, found that the defendant was simply trying to
boycott the trial and ruled that his defense lawyers were required to continue to represent the defendant in court:544 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Gunawardana explained:
In the instant case, the interests of justice would not be best served by allowing the accused, who does not wish to attend his trial, to remain without representation. As stated by Justice Blackmun, "the right to Counsel
has been based on the premise that representation by Counsel is essential
to insure a fair trial." Therefore, in my view, the Chamber is bound to ensure that Mr. Barayagwiza is represented at the trial. In that context, in my
view, it will be useful to consider the established procedure adopted in the
United States of appointing standby counsel, by the Court. The Supreme
50

Id.

51 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel
Motion to Withdraw (Trial Chamber I, Nov. 2, 2000). For a good discussion on this case, see
Scharf, supra note 6, at 41.
52 See Scharf, supra note 6, at 41.
53 Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T,. IT 11-12 (quoting Letters from Jean-Basco
Barayagwiza, defendant, to Trial Chamber I, Int'l Criminal Trib. for Rwanda) (Oct. 23,
2000; Oct. 24, 2000) (emphasis added).
54 See id. 24 (referencing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
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Court approved the appointment of standby counsel and discussed the role
of such a Counsel, in its Decision in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 US 168
(1984) where, in a robbery trial, the accused was permitted to proceed pro
se, but the trial court appointed a standby counsel to assist him. The Supreme Court held,
"Accordingly, we make explicit today what is already explicit in Feretta
[sic]:55 A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights [to self representation] are
not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel--even over the
defendant's objection-to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a
defendant through the basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the
unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's appearance of control over his own defence."
This solution has been tried and tested in the United States, and has been
proved to be an effective and appropriate procedure to assist the proper
administration of justice. In my view, the appointment of a standby 56counsel is the proper solution to the problem presented in the instant case.
Dealing with a factual situation very similar to that of the Saddam
trial, the Court in Faretta ruled that a trial judge may "terminate selfrepresentation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. 57 Again, mirroring the Saddam trial, the Faretta
court concluded that "a State may ... appoint a 'standby counsel' .. to be
available to represent the accused in the58event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary.,
In Barayagwiza, the ICTR further stated that counsel could only be
withdrawn if incompetent:
As the Chamber observed in its decision of 25 October 2000, Mr Barayagwiza does not lack confidence in his two lawyers. Neither does he argue
that they are incompetent. The core of his argument is that he will not be
given a fair trial. He argues that the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda is not an independent and impartial Tribunal, but dependent on
the Kigali regime.

55 McKaskle v. Wiggins actually states "[a]ccordingly, we make explicit today what is
already implicit in Faretta.
Judge Gunawardana misquotes the case, though the substance remains unchanged.
56

Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T (Gunawardana, J., concurring) (citing Faretta,

422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
" Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970)).
58

Id. (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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59
This allegation is without foundation.

In the case of Prosecutorv. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali,the ICTR
again had to decide whether to impose counsel on an uncooperative defendant. 60 Here, the tribunal granted the defendant's request for withdrawal of
counsel, but determined that, in the interest of justice, new defense counsel
should be imposed on the defendant to assist in the case. 61
Other international war crimes tribunals have upheld the right to
self-representation. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) guarantees a
defendant's right to self-representation. 62 Article 17(4)(d) of the SCSL's
Statute guarantees the right of the accused
[t]o be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed,
if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice
so require, and without payment by him or her
in any such case if he or she
63
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
However, in decisions similar to those of the ICTY and ICTR, the
SCSL has also ruled that the right to self-representation is a limited right. In
the case of Prosecutorv. Samuel Hinga Norman, the defendant notified the
court that he wanted to represent himself.64 The SCSL ruled that the right to
self-representation is not absolute. 65 A defendant has the right to selfrepresentation, but "such a right, being qualified and not absolute, could in
the light of certain circumstances, be derogated should the interest of justice
so dictate.

66

The SCSL relied on the concept of the interests of justice, a "multi
faceted legal concept which is all encompassing and a vital component...
of the Rule of law.' ' 67 It denied the defendant's request for selfrepresentation, reasoning that exercising that right could jeopardize the
s9 Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T,

14-15.
60 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on Ntahobali's Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel (Trial Chamber II, June 22, 2001).
61 Id.

62

20.

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4)(d), http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-

statute.html.
63

Id.

64 Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the
Special Court, 4-5 (Trial Chamber, June 8, 2004).
6

Id.I 8-9.

6' Id. 30.
67 Id. 10.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 39:171

rights of his co-defendants, and also that the defendant's late request to conduct his own defense would result in unnecessary delays for the proceedings.68
The SCSL ruled that the defendant needed some degree of assistance.69 The court set forth several conditions for determining when to impose counsel, including whether assigning counsel was an essential and
necessary component of a fair trial, whether it would enable the judges to
perform their role as neutral arbitrators of the law, whether the assigned
counsel would assist in exceptionally complex cases, and whether there was
an interest in a speedy trial.70 In essence, the court felt that it had a broad
duty to guarantee the integrity of the trial proceedings, and assigning defense counsel under appropriate circumstances helped achieve this goal.7 l
Another example is the International Criminal Court (ICC) 72 which,
following its predecessor international courts, guarantees the right of an
accused to "conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance of the
accused's choosing. 73 More importantly, the ICC registry is responsible for
providing assistance to an accused who has chosen to exercise the right to
self-representation. 74
The newly created Cambodia War Crimes Tribunal guarantees individuals appearing before the tribunal the right to self-representation. 7
Although the Cambodian Law on Criminal Procedure suggests that a defendant does not have a right to self-representation, it seems likely that the
Statute controlling the tribunal, which permits self-representation, will prevail.
At the other end of the spectrum, the War Crimes Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina requires an accused to be assisted by counsel when he is
charged with a crime for which a prison sentence of at least ten years may
be imposed.76
14, 19-20.
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Id.
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Id. 26.

"

See id. 28.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-

72

Id.

32.

inafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournalRome_
Statute_120704-EN.pdf.
71 Id.art. 67(1)(d).
74 Regulation 119(2) reads: "The Registrar shall also provide appropriate assistance to a
person who has chosen to represent himself or herself." Regulations of the Registry, ICCBD/03-01-06 (Mar. 6, 2006).
75 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 35(d)
(Cambodia), availableat http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/seasia/doc/krlaw.html.
76
Law on Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina art. 36(6) (Bosn. & Herz.).
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Based on the experiences of past and current international, hybrid,
and domestic tribunals, the Iraqi Tribunal's decision to restrict or to outright
prohibit a defendant from representing himself is, in my view, permissible.
Other legal experts have argued that the Iraqi Tribunal's position
was too draconian and that it should have created a less restrictive approach,
such as appointing amici curiae.77 The appointment of amici curiae would
resolve what some have argued is an untenable situation-assigning counsel
over the objection of the accused. A defense attorney cannot effectively
advocate on behalf of someone who does not want assistance, creating an
ethical dilemma for assigned counsel. By appointing amici curiae, the court
maintains legitimacy without sacrificing the defendant's right to selfrepresentation. 78 Even if the court removes the defendant because of egregious conduct, the amici curiae could still aid the judges as the case continues. 79 The amici curiae could ensure that the interests of the accused are
represented without resorting to the "legal fiction" of "imposed" defense
counsel.8 °
A second possibility would be to conduct a balancing test to determine a defendant's right to self-representation. 81 This approach has merit
and is similar to the legal reasoning used by the ICTY and ICTR. A balancing test takes into account the rights of the accused and the court's interest
in conducting a fair trial.82 The approach is premised on the belief that the
court has the discretion to impose counsel on an unwilling defendant, minding both the rights of the defendant and the need to proceed with the trial.
Thus, a defendant's abusive conduct (obstructing proceedings, boycotting
the trial, etc.) would cause the balance to tip in favor of the interests of justice, and, consequently, the complete forfeiture of the right to selfrepresentation. 83
The first case before the Iraqi Tribunal faced such a situation. In the
Dujail trial and more recently in the Anfal trial, the defendants, including

77 See generally Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself.
Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appropriate Option, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 47
(2006).
78 Id. at 62-63.
ld. at 63.
80

id.

81

Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation at International Criminal

Tribunals:Striking a Balance between Fairnessand Effectiveness, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 64,
76-77 (2006).
82
83

Id. at 70.
Interview with Sebasitian van de Vliet, Head of the Office of Legal Assistance and

Detention, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the Hague (July 11,

2006).
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Saddam Hussein, were abusive and disruptive. 84 Soon after a new chief
judge was appointed to oversee the Dujail trial, Saddam Hussein and the
three other lead defendants were removed from the courtroom and tried in
absentia on January 24, 2006. 8' One of the defendants, Barzan Ibrahim alTikriti, twice called the court "a daughter of adultery., 86 When Saddam was
removed, he yelled to the chiefjudge: "Don't call yourself an Iraqi, I've led
you for 35 years and now you say 'remove him!' Shame on you! Shame on
you!", 87 Barzan al-Tikriti was forcefully removed from the courtroom a second time on May 31, 2006, after continually referring to the chief judge as a
Kurd.88 On June 12, 2006, he was again removed from the court by security
89
guards after he accused the judge of being a "dictator."
A month into the Anfal trial, Saddam Hussein was expelled from
court when he objected to the government's removal of the first appointed
chief judge.90 On September 25, 2006, after less than two hours back in
court Saddam Hussein was ejected again, this time following an outburst
when the court refused his request not to appear for the remainder of the
trial. 91 Saddam Hussein was ejected a third time in the Anfal trial when he
defied instructions from the chief judge not to obstruct court proceedings.9 2
His co-defendants were also ejected after heated exchanges with the chief
judge. 93 On October 10, 2006, Saddam Hussein was again removed from
court after shouting a verse from the Quran and yelling, "fight them and

84

See Mark Ellis, Can Saddam's Trial Be Salvaged?, INT.

HERALD TRIB.,

Feb. 10, 2006,

available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2OO6/O2/09/opinion/edellis.php.
85

Robert F. Worth, New Judge Orders Saddam From Court, INT.

HERALD TRIB.,

Jan. 30,

2006, availableat http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/29/news/saddam.php.
86
Id.
87

Id.

88 Judge Orders Saddam's Half-Brother out of Court, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, May
31, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=27329 1&area=/breakingnews/
breakingnews _internationalnews; see also Saddam 's Half-Brother Thrown out of Court,
BAHRAIN TRIB., June 1, 2006, availableat http://www.bahraintribune.conArticleDetail.asp?
Categoryld=2&Articleld= 109143.
89 Anger Erupts in Saddam Courtroom, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/
middleeast/5071080.stm (last visited May 18, 2007).
90 Judge Orders Saddam out of Court, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
middleeast/5362502.stm (last visited May 18, 2007).
91 Saddam Thrown out of CourtAgain, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/mid
die_east/5376566.stm (last visited May 18, 2007).
92 Saddam Thrown outfor Third Time, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hi/world/midd
leeast/5380520.stm (last visited May 18, 2007).
93 Id.
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God will punish them."94 Another defendant, Hussain Rashid Muhammad,
was also ejected after shouting insults to the prosecutors.95
It was evident from these actions that the defendants were keen to
use the trial proceedings as a platform to advance their own political agendas. If the court had allowed Saddam to defend himself, there is little doubt
that the trial would have collapsed into complete chaos.
The experience of the Saddam trial suggests that it may be appropriate for any court trying international crimes to mandate that defendants
be represented by counsel.96 This is consistent with the policy adopted by
the court in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The right to self-representation should
be narrowed and restricted by the interest of justice precisely because these
types of cases are97highly charged, highly political, and "reach the limits of
human capacity.,
Moreover, due to the nature of these trials, self-representation is
likely to be unworkable. This is primarily because (1) the depth and range
of legal knowledge required in international criminal cases far exceed that
which is required in typical domestic criminal cases; (2) international courts
rely on a combination of civil law and common law rules; (3) extensive
work is required to adequately mount a defense in international criminal
cases; and (4) access to evidence and witnesses is particularly complicated
in international criminal cases, due to the nature of the crimes and typically
the distant location of their occurrence.98
In the Saddam trial, the court responded to the disruptive behavior
of Saddam Hussein and his defense counsel by appointing standby counsel.
Some have argued that imposing standby counsel weakens the fundamental

94 Bushra Juhi & Jamal Halaby, Saddam Thrown Out of Genocide Trial, WASH. POST, Oct.
10, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/1 0/10/
AR2006101000148.html.
95 Id.
96 See

Scharf, supra note 6, at 33 ("The thought of the former Iraqi leader appearing on the
nightly news throughout the Middle East, riling against the illegal invasion of Iraq, insisting
that the Western countries were complicit in war crimes against Iran, and encouraging his
followers to commit acts of violence against the newly elected Iraqi government, is indeed
frightening, especially in light of the stakes involved.").
97 Interview with David Tolbert, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, in the Hague (July 11, 2006). Tolbert notes that Milosevic was allowed to put a great deal of irrelevant evidence forward in the course of conducting his own
representation.
98 Scharf, supra note 6, at 39.
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independence of counsel. 99 They are alarmed by what they see as a practice
of continually carving out exceptions to the right to self-representation.' 00
However, the experience of the Saddam trial shows that the use of
standby counsel was both appropriate and effective. In the Dujail case,
standby counsel were allowed on several occasions when the defendants or
their counsel were removed from court because of disruptive behavior.
On February 1, 2006, the four key defendants in the Dujail trialSaddam Hussein, Barzan Ibrahim, Taha Yussin Ramadan, and Awad Haman Barder--did not appear in court; neither did their attorneys. The court
appointed lawyers to represent those lesser known defendants who did appear for the proceedings-Ali Daeem Ali, Mohammed Azawi Ali, and Abdullah Kudhim Ruweid. l '' When, on February 28, 2006, Saddam's lead
attorneys walked out
of the courtroom, the judge replaced them with court02
appointed lawyers. 1
At the start of the Anfal case, in protest of the government's decision to remove the chief judge, defense counsel walked out of the proceedings. 10 3 When it was clear that they would continue to boycott the trial, they
were replaced by eight court-appointed lawyers so that the proceedings
would continue.' °4 By October 9, 2006, the court-appointed lawyers were
05
appearing daily as Saddam Hussein's attorneys maintained their boycott.
On each occasion, the standby counsel did a superb job, particularly crossexamining witnesses and on closing arguments.
99 Interview with Melinda Taylor, Former Defence Attorney, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the Hague (July 11, 2006).
100 Melinda Taylor calls this practice "disturbing." She contends that creating exceptions
due to the nature of the crimes or the nature of the accused is not an advisable practice. For
instance, in the case of Milosevic, she evinces concern with the court's reliance on health as
a ground to restrict the right. Id. Joeri Maas agrees that the decision in Milosevic was problematic; if a defendant is not obstructive, Maas says he should be allowed to represent himself. Interview with Joeri Maas, Head of the Office of the Association of Defence Council,
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in The Hague (July 10, 2006).
101 Jonathan Finer & Bassam Sebti, In Hussein's Absence, Witnesses Take Spotlight,
WASH. POsT, Feb. 2, 2006, at A16.
102 Nadra Saouli, Saddam Trial Back, Lawyers Walk Out, IAFRICA.COM, http://iafrica.
com/news/specialreport/saddamtrial/930247.htm (last visited May 19, 2007).
103 Saddam Hussein's Genocide Trial Resumes Without Lawyers; Saddam Thrown Out,
USATODAY.COM, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-09-25-saddam-trial-x.ht
m (last visited May 19, 2007).
104 Alastair Macdonald & Ahmed Rasheed, Saddam Sent Out of Court Again as Lawyers
Boycott, NZHERALD.CO.UK, http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfn?l_id=8&ObjectlD=
10402964 (last visited May 19, 2007).
105 See Saddam Genocide Trial Continues, ALJAZEERA, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
archive/archive?Archiveld=36641 (last visited May 19, 2007) (describing, in an article updated October 12, 2006, the events that took place during the Saddam Hussein trial during
the week of October 9, 2006, "despite a boycott by Saddam's defence lawyers").
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IV. WAS THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL CORRECT IN REMOVING DEFENSE

COUNSEL?

The Iraqi Tribunal's reliance on standby counsel raises questions
about whether a defendant's chosen counsel can properly be removed from
court proceedings. In the Saddam trials, the defendants' own counsel frequently walked out or were forcibly removed by the chief judge. On December 5, 2005, the attorneys left because the judge refused to allow former
U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, one of Saddam's attorneys, to challenge the tribunal's legitimacy in an address to the court. 0 6 The entire defense team walked out and one lawyer was dragged out when a newly appointed chief judge ordered all four lead defendants out of the courtroom on
January 29, 2006.107
Again on February 28, 2006, the defense attorneys stormed out of
court. The attorneys demanded that the trial be postponed and that the judge
and chief prosecutor be dismissed. 08 On April 5, 2006, one of Saddam's
main defense attorneys, Bushra Khalil, was ejected from the court after 1at09
tempting to display photos of Iraqis tortured in U.S. managed prisons.
The judge permitted her to return six weeks later.' 10 However, on her first
day back in court, the chief judge ordered guards to remove her from the
court when she refused to wait her turn to speak. 1 ' As she12 was forcibly
removed, she threw her lawyer's robe to the courtroom floor."
During the second trial-the Anfal trial-Saddam Hussein's Tunisian lawyer, Ahmed Saddiq, walked out when he was told that he must
speak through Saddam's lead attorney. 3 On September 20, 2006, all of the
defense lawyers left the courtroom in protest of the government's decision
to remove the chiefjudge.14
106 Ron Synovitz, Iraq: Hussein Lawyers Contest Tribunal's Legitimacy, RADIO FREE
EUROPE, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/a796354a-eceb-4blb-8a
0f-53f43e45c180.html.
107

Worth, supra note 85.

108

Saouli, supra note 102.

109 Saddam Hussein Dismisses Evidence, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
middleeast/4878340.stm (last visited May 19, 2007) (explaining, in an article updated April
5, 2006, that "[a] defence lawyer was ejected from court after an altercation with the judge..
. when she tried to display photos of Iraqis tortured in US-run prisons).
110 See Lawyer Thrown Out of Saddam Trial, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mid
dle_east/5003944.stm (last visited May 19, 2007) (describing, in an article updated May 22,
2006, Ms. Khalil's return on Monday after her removal form court in April).
1 See id.
112

See id.

113

Saddam Trial Resumes With Testimony From Kurdish-American Witness, COURT Tv

NEWS, http://www.courttv.com/trials/saddam/091106_ap.html (last visited May 19, 2007).
114 Judge OrdersSaddam Out of Court,supra note 90.
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The Iraqi Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence allow the
trial chamber to remove defendants and their counsel under the following
conditions:
Rule 52: Control of Proceedings
First: The Trial Chamber may exclude any person from the proceedings in
order to protect the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, or to
maintain the dignity and decorum of the proceedings.
Second: The Trial Chamber may not order an accused to be removed from
the court during proceedings unless he acted disruptively. In the event of
removal, the proceedings continue until he can be present and the court
should make him aware of the proceedings he missed.
Rule 31: Misconduct of Counsel
First: A Judge or Trial Chamber may take legal action against a counsel, if,
in its opinion, the Counsel's conduct becomes offensive or abusive or demeans the 15dignity or decorum of the Special Tribunal or obstructs the proceedings. 1
The Iraqi Criminal Code provides the same authority to all Iraqi
courts. Paragraph 154 of the code provides that "[t]he court may prevent the
parties and their representatives [from] speaking at undue length or speaking outside the subject of the case, reporting statements, violating guidelines
or making accusations against another party or a person outside the case
who is unable to put forward a defence."' " 16 Paragraph 158 of the Code further states that "[t]he defendant may not be removed from the Courtroom
during consideration of the case unless he violates the rules of the court, in
which case, procedures continue as if he were present. The court ' must
keep
17
absence."'
his
in
place
took
which
procedures
the
of
him informed
This inherent right of a court to control its own proceedings has also
been recognized by international criminal tribunals. In Prosecutorv. Kovac,
the ICTY suspended an attorney who was charged with contempt of court.
The tribunal stated:
The Tribunal does, however, possess an inherent jurisdiction, deriving
from its judicial function, to ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction
which is expressly given it by the Tribunal Statue is not frustrated and that
its basic judicial functions are safeguarded. As an international criminal
court, the Tribunal therefore possesses the inherent power to deal with

115

Al-Waqa'I Al-Iraqiya [The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq] R. P. & Evid. Iraqi

Special Tribunal, Oct. 18, 2005, No. 4006, availableat http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtriall
documents/IST-rulesprocedureevidence.pdf.
116 Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments of 1971,

154 (Iraq), available at

http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi-Criminal-Procedure-Code.pdf.
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Id.
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conduct which interferes with its administration of justice .... such an in-

18
herent power includes the power to refuse audience to counsel.1

V. WAS THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL CORRECT IN REMOVING THE DEFENDANTS
FROM THE COURT?
The Iraqi Tribunal's decision to remove the defendants from the

courtroom also raises issues as to whether such an act violated the right of a
defendant to be "tried in his presence." Article 20(4)(d) of the Iraqi Tribunal
Statute guarantees this right. 119 All international criminal tribunal statutes
provide similar guarantees. 120 Article 14.3 of the Internatioanl Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the fundamental basis for this
guarantee, stating in part:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assignedto him,
in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
121

Iraq ratified the ICCPR in 1976.122
The requirement that the accused be tried in his presence, as articulated in the ICCPR, is considered to be a prerequisite for a fair trial. However, this right is not absolute. As far back as 1983, the Human Rights
Committee has stated that the ICCPR does not bar trials in abstentia when,
for instance, "the accused person, although informed of the proceedings
23
sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise his right to be present."'1
In the landmark case of Barayagwiza,the ICTR tried and sentenced
a defendant who, although aware of the proceedings against him, refused to
11 Prosecutor v. Kova6, Case No. IT-96-23&23/l, Decision on the Request of the Accused
Radomir Kovac to Allow Mr. M. Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro Bono (Trial
Chamber, Mar. 14, 2000). See also Prosecutor v. Kova6, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, Separate
Opinion of Judge Hunt (Trial Chamber, Mar. 24, 2000).
"19 The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 20(4)(d) guarantees the right of the accused "[t]o be tried in his presence."
120 See, e.g. ICC Statute, supranote 72, art. 63; ICTY Statute, supra note 8, art. 21(4)(d).
121 ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 14(3) (emphasis added).
122 ICCPR Ratifications and Reservations, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last
visited June 2, 2007).
123 Herman Schwartz, Trials in Absentia, Human Rights Brief (1996) http://www.wcl.amer
ican.edu/hrbrief/v4i I/schwar4 I .htm.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 39:171

appear before the tribunal. The ICTR discussed the reasoning to move forward with the trial:
The trial in the so-called Media-cases started on 23 October 2000. One
of the three accused, Mr. Barayagwiza, has chosen not to attend the proceedings. The reasons for his absence were advanced in his letter of 24 October 2000, where he stated:
"I would like to confirm to you the content of my statement of 23 October 2000, by which I informed you of my decision not to attend the socalled "Media Trial" in the Trial Chamber I to the International Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) for the reasons stated in that statement.
"I challenged the ability of the ICTR to render an independent and impartial justice due, notably, to the fact that it is so dependent on the dictatorial anti-Hum regime of Kigali to which two of you paid recently a
working visit aimed at strengthening relations to the detriment of my
rights."
Thus, in the present case, Mr. Barayagwiza is fully aware of his trial,
but has chosen not to be present, despite being informed by the Chamber
that he may join the proceedings at any time. In such circumstances,where
the accusedhas been duly informed of his ongoing trial,neither the Statute
nor human rights law prevent the case against him from proceeding in his

absence. ,,124

The court also noted several decisions by the ECHR and the Human
Rights Committee supporting trials in absentia:
Article 20 of the Statute is modelled on Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whicl is equivalent to Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Human rights
case law does not prevent that a trial takes place in the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified of the proceedings. Reference is made to Maleki v. Italy, views of the Human Rights Committee,
adopted on 27 July 1999 (Communication No 699/1996). Here, the Committee reiterated that a trial in absentia is compatible with Article 14, only
when the accused is summoned in a timely manner and informed of the
proceedings against him. In that case, the accused was convicted in absentia, duly represented by his court-appointed lawyer (paragraph 9.3). Similar principles are developed in Strasbourg case-law, see, for instance, the
Court's judgement of 28 August 1991 in F C B v Italy (Series A 208-B)
with further references (paragraphs 29-36).125

Iraq's own Criminal Procedure Code provides for trials in absentia.
Paragraph 135 of the code reads:

124

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel

Motion to Withdraw, J 5-6 (Trial Chamber 1,Nov. 2, 2000) (emphasis added).
125 Id. 7.
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If the defendant does not appear before the examining magistrate or investigator, and is not arrested the use of methods of compulsion stipulated in
this law, or if he escapes after arrest or detention, and if there is sufficient
evidence for a transfer to court, the examining magistrate issues a decision
of transfer to126the court responsible in order for a trial to be conducted in
his absence.
Paragraph 147(A) of the Code also states: "The trial will take place
when the two parties attend. If the accused has absconded or is absent without legal excuse,
despite his having been informed, a trial will take place in
127
his absence.'
However, the case of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants does
not fall under any of the aforementioned categories of absconding beyond
the tribunal's jurisdiction. Saddam was present at his arraignment and appeared in court. The issue, of course, is that Saddam was removed from the
court and the trial proceeded in his absence. As discussed earlier, the Iraqi
Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows the trial28 to proceed
when the defendant is disruptive and is subsequently removed. 1
The Iraqi Tribunal's Statute mirrors the statutes of other international criminal tribunals with regard to trials in absentia. The ICTY's Rules
of Procedure and Evidence provides that a trial chamber may "order the
removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue the proceedings in
the absence of the accused if the accused has persisted in disruptive conduct
following a warning that such
conduct may warrant the removal of the ac12 9
cused from the courtroom."'

In the United States, the case of Illinois v. Allen' 30 dealt with similar
antics by a defendant. In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a
defendant may lose his right to be present at a trial "if, after he has been
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
behavior, he nevertheless insist on conducting himself in a manner to disorLaw on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments of 1971,
135 (Iraq) available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi-Criminal-Procedure-Code.pdf
127
Id. 147(A).
128
AI-Waqa'I Al-Iraqiya [The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq] R. P. & Evid. Iraqi
126

Special Tribunal, Oct. 18, 2005, No. 4006, availableat http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documents/IST-rulesprocedureevidence.pdf. Rule 52 states that "the Trial Chamber may
exclude any person from the proceedings in order to protect the right of the accused to a fair
and public trial, or to maintain the dignity and decorum of the proceedings." Id. Furthermore,
"the Trial Chamber may not order an accused to be removed from the court during proceedings unless he acted disruptively. In the event of removal, the proceedings continue until he
can be present and the court should make him aware of the proceedings he missed." Id.
129
ICTY, R.P & Evid., $ 80(B) U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev.38 (June 13, 2006) available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev38e.pdf.
130
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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derly, disruptive, and disrespectful 131
of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom."'
The ICC's Statute provides similar recourse for a disruptive defendant.
If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the
trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make provision
for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the
courtroom, through the use of communications technology, if required.
Such measures shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other
reasonable alternatives32have proved inadequate, and only for such duration
as is strictly required. 1

The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
addresses this same issue and provides the following guidance:
(A)An accused may not be tried in his absence, unless:
(i) the accused has made his initial appearance, has been afforded the right
to appear at his own trial, but refuses to so do; or
(ii) the accused, having made his initial appearance is at large and refuses
to appear in court.
(B)In either case the accused may be represented by counsel of his choice,
or as directed by a Judge or Trial Chamber. The matter may be permitted
to proceed if the Judge or Trial Chamber is satisfied that
the accused has,
33
expressly or impliedly, waived his right to be present. 1
Elaborating on these requirements, the court in Prosecutorv. Hinga
Norman13 4 held that the defendant's boycott of the proceedings was an effort to obstruct justice and, thus, in the interest of justice the trial would
continue in his absence. However, the court ensured that the accused would
not lose
the benefit of legal representation merely because of his absence at
135
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
As presented in this article, both Iraqi and international law give the
Iraqi Tribunal significant latitude in controlling the trial proceedings. This
131 Id. at

343.

ICC Statute, supranote 72, art. 63(2).
133 SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, R. P. &EVID. 60, availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/scslprocedure.html.
134 Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-125, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute
of the Special Court (Trial Chamber, June 8, 2004), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/Docu
ments/SCSL-04-14-T- 125.pdf.
132

135

Id. 32.
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includes the authority to remove defendants who are disruptive or whose
behaviour undermines the integrity of the court. It also includes authority to
dismiss defense attorneys who ignore judges' instructions and to impose
court-appointed attorneys on the defendants. Despite the disorder and, at
times, flawed nature of the trial proceedings, the court, including its judges
and prosecutors, performed admirably.
The failures of the Saddam trial actually had very little to do with
what occurred inside the courtroom. The most fundamental component of a
fair, independent, and impartial trial is the absence of government interference. Regrettably, the Iraqi government displayed a complete lack of adherence to this most basic principle.
Holding Saddam Hussein legally responsible for his actions was a
test for Iraq. Many had pinned their hopes on the trial in part to bring closure to an era, but also to establish Iraq's commitment to the rule of law.
The trial was an opportunity to demonstrate that the Iraqi legal system is
capable of conducting fair and impartial legal proceedings.
In the end, the Iraqi government's blatant interference in the trial
process thwarted these aspirations. The casualty was the court, whose legitimacy and prestige has been irrevocably weakened. Saddam was convicted, but rather than being remembered for unveiling truth and carrying
out justice, the Iraqi Tribunal will be seen as yet another government tool. It
did not have to be this way.

